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Abstract
Prior empirical investigations of corporate failures consider the effects of macroeconomic
conditions and financial health, but the literature contains limited evidence of the real
effects of the bank shocks caused by the sovereign debt crisis. Using a rich source of
high-quality firm-bank matched data for 2005-2014, this study examines the real effects
of bank shocks on firms’ survival prospects in Portugal. We first present evidence that a
funding outflow is associated with a reduction in the credit supply. Furthermore, firms
borrowing from banks exposed to the funding outflow are more likely to fail. We also
uncover significant heterogeneity in firms’ financial positions and show that the negative
effect of a funding shock is stronger for younger, higher-risk firms, and those that used
their potential lines of bank credit.
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1. Introduction
Financial health affects company failures, both according to theory and the
existing empirical evidence. Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)’s theoretical
model predicts that financial constraints are important for survival and shows
that the failure rate decreases with size and age.1 Empirically, many studies
examine firm survival from a financial perspective and conclude that firms’
chances of survival respond strongly to a number of balance sheet indicators
(Zingales (1998); Bunn and Redwood (2003); Bridges and Guariglia (2008)
and Huynh et al. (2010)).2 However, the literature remains relatively silent
on whether shocks that have a strong impact on financial intermediaries can
translate into real effects, especially in terms of survival prospects.3
Investigating the effect of bank shocks at the extensive margin is a key
issue to understanding which types of firms are more exposed to extreme
financial shocks. Such evidence is valuable for both policy-makers and academic
researchers for several reasons. First, if efficient firms may still have to exit if
they lack adequate access to finance, then this suggests an effect beyond the
mechanism through which creative destruction works.4 Second, bankruptcies
destroy firms’ value through under-investment and asset fire sales that simple
downsizing does not.5 Third, firm exits create unemployment with the adverse
consequence of human capital depreciation. Fourth, aggregate employment
recovers more slowly if firms exit than if they downsize (Bentolila et al. (2017)).
Fifth, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which make up a large
proportion of our sample, exit at an alarming rate (Mata and Portugal (1994)).
Finally, it is possible that creditors will take longer to recover debt from exiting
firms, and if they do they will likely recover a small fraction of that, which
poses a difficulty for credit institutions. Considering these factors, it is therefore
important to inform the debate on whether access to finance is likely to hinder
the successful operations of non-financial firms.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the impact
of bank shocks on firms’ chances of survival. Our empirical approach proceeds
in two steps. We begin by assessing the response of banks exposed to funding
1. Conversely, the conditional probability of survival increases with the value of the firm’s
equity.
2. For example, Zingales (1998) uses data for the US trucking industry and shows that
highly leveraged firms are less likely to survive. Other studies produce similar evidence for
other industries and countries (see, for example, Bunn and Redwood (2003) and Bridges and
Guariglia (2008) for UK manufacturing and services industries, Musso and Schiavo (2008) for
French manufacturing firms, and Tsoukas (2011) for Asian companies).
3. Throughout the paper, we use the terms survival and failure interchangeably.
4. Schivardi et al. (2017) show that when lending is performed by under-capitalized banks,
non-zombie firms are more likely to go bankrupt compared to their counterparts.
5. See Jackson (1986) on how financial distress raises the common pool problem, which then
destroys company value.
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shocks to the supply of credit to firms. Next, we investigate the consequences
of deteriorating credit conditions for firms’ survival prospects. Our premise
is that firms borrowing from banks exposed to shocks should show a higher
probability of failure. Drawing on a large matched firm-bank dataset from
Portugal, we focus on a bank funding shock measured by interbank liabilities
and deposit funding.6 Moreover, we do not expect that a shock will affect all
firms proportionally. We argue that heterogeneity in firms’ financial positions
is likely to play a critical role in amplifying the bank shocks. That is, we assess
whether the effect of bank funding shocks on firm survival depends upon firm
characteristics such as credit line drawdown activity, probability of default, and
age.
Portugal, despite its smaller size than other European economies, warrants
a thorough investigation for a number of reasons. First, the magnitude of
the sovereign debt crisis, as evidenced by the sovereign debt spreads, is one
of the largest in the euro area. Second, a large unanticipated shock hit the
banking system and Portugal witnessed a substantial drop in the volume of
new loans by 45% over the 2008-2013 period (see Acharya et al. (2018)).7
Third, a large percentage of Portuguese firms are small according to the
European Commission’s criteria: only 1% are large and 85% are micro. Hence,
SMEs in Portugal are heavily bank dependent, so the firms in our sample are
unlikely to substitute bank credit from shocked banks with market finance.
If anything, this is likely to intensify the real effects of the funding shocks.
This can have important economic implications since smaller firms have a
considerable weight in the Portuguese economy, with SMEs contributing around
55% of turnover and 75% of employment.8 Fourth, Portugal recently changed
its legislation on exit and restructuring barriers to allow prompt initiation of the
insolvency or restructuring process (Gouveia and Osterhold (2018)). Therefore,
the insolvency framework in Portugal is closer to that of international best
practices (e.g., Chapter 11 in the US). Finally, we have access to a rich source
of high-quality firm-bank matched data.
Our work contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we consider
the transmission of funding shocks on firms’ survival prospects. We thus speak
directly to the literature on firm survival, which typically includes a set of
financial variables in equations that model firm exits (see Zingales (1998);
Bunn and Redwood (2003); Bridges and Guariglia (2008); and Huynh et al.
(2010)). Our approach also complements the existing empirical literature on
firm outcomes and lending shocks (see Chodorow-Reich (2014); Bottero et al.
(2015); Cingano et al. (2016); Balduzzi et al. (2017); Bentolila et al. (2017);
6. In further empirical tests, we use banks’ holdings of risky sovereign debt and Credit Default
Swap (CDS) spreads as alternative instruments of shocks that affect the banking system.
7. The reduction in the loan supply in Europe was particularly severe in the later part of the
sovereign debt crisis (Becker and Ivashina (2017)).
8. Authors’ calculation using the Informcao Empresarial Simplicada (IES) database.
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Dwenger et al. (2017); Popov and Rocholl (2017) and Acharya et al. (2018)),
which highlights the real effects of bank balance sheet shocks at the firm level.
Prior studies focus on exogenous shocks and their impact on real activities
such as investment, asset growth, and employment. Our study completes the
picture by looking at firm closures. As we argued above, this is an important
consideration because firm closures were a major concern during the recent
financial crisis. Firm survival and growth are important aspects of industry
dynamics and form the competitive landscape in an economy. Moreover, we
extend the existing line of work by considering different channels of transmission
of shocks from the financial to the real sector. Specifically, we account for
a funding outflow, banks’ exposure to risky sovereign debt, and banks’ CDS
spreads.
The second main contribution is that we uncover significant heterogeneity
in firms’ financial positions. An extensive literature on firm heterogeneity posits
that firms that face constraints in some financial markets are more likely
to be associated with a higher degree of information asymmetry, and may
therefore find it difficult to access external finance. Previous empirical studies
on financing constraints emphasize the importance of size, age, and dividend
payouts in firms’ real activities.9 In the financial intermediation literature,
high risk firms and those with fewer tangible assets are relatively sensitive
to bank capital shocks (Popov and Udell (2012)).10 Balduzzi et al. (2017) use
size and age to disentangle the effects of banks’ financial market valuations
on firms’ decisions for different groups of firms. We build on this line of work
by employing three indicators, namely credit line drawdowns, probability of
default, and firms’ age, to assess whether firms of various types respond to
bank shocks differently.
Finally, we employ a rich, but relatively unexploited, firm-bank matched
data set, combining data from the Portuguese Credit Register with Central
Balance-sheet data. The latter collects annual financial statements for the
period 2005-2014 on all non-financial corporations (around 500,000). This is
a much broader sample of firms than prior studies use. Credit register records
detailed monthly bank-firm level data on all loans by all credit institutions
operating in Portugal. These data are essential for the analysis as they allow us
to recover all existing bank-firm relationships and the corresponding amount
of credit that flows over time. Therefore, we can show that a bank funding
shock is uncorrelated with banks’ ex-ante credit supply, and this is not driven
by demand for bank loans. An appealing characteristic of the data set is
9. Size is the key proxy for capital market access by manufacturing firms in Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) because small firms are more vulnerable to capital market imperfections and
are thus more likely to be financially constrained. In summary, these factors affect the corporate
policies of financially constrained firms severely compared to their unconstrained counterparts.
10. Iyer et al. (2013) and Bentolila et al. (2017) provide evidence of micro-level heterogeneity
for Portugal and Spain, respectively.
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that it covers the universe of non-financial firms matched with the universe
of banks, and our study therefore does not suffer from concerns about the
representativeness of the data.
We present evidence that a negative bank funding shock is associated with
a reduction in the credit supply. In other words, banks exposed to funding
outflows subsequently tighten credit conditions for the same borrower relative
to less affected banks. We next show that this shock is transmitted to the
real sector, paying special attention to firm closures. We show that firms that
maintain a pre-crisis relationship with banks that experience a larger funding
outflow are more likely to fail, all else being equal. In addition, we document
alternative channels of transmission from banks to firms, which may be helpful
in identifying banks that are more vulnerable to adverse financial events by
focusing on banks’ exposure to sovereign debt and their CDS spreads.
In addition, we find a noticeable negative effect of being financially
constrained on the probability of firm exit. When we consider firm
heterogeneity, we find that a firm’s degree of financial constraints is a critical
determinant of real responses to funding shocks. We interact funding shocks
with a set of firm characteristics and show that the negative effect of the various
shocks on the hazard of exit is more potent for firms that used their lines
of credit, have a higher probability of default, and are younger. Overall, our
evidence provides a key contribution to the literature on firm survival, bank
lending, and financial shocks.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief
summary of the relevant literature. Sections 3 and 4 describe our methodology
and dataset, respectively. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6
reports the robustness tests and Section 7 concludes.
2. Related literature
A quickly evolving line of work investigates the impact of recent crises on firms’
real decisions. Existing evidence on this area is relatively scarce due to the
limited data available for firm-bank relationships, as well as that for financial
information for both firms and banks. Prior works initially identify the real
effects of the credit supply at the aggregate level or on sub-samples of listed
companies (see Peek and Rosengren (2000); Campello et al. (2010); Almeida
et al. (2012) and Amiti and Weinstein (2017)).
At the firm-level, Bentolila et al. (2017) show that firms attached to weaker
banks that were eventually bailed out by the Spanish government suffered
a larger fall in employment. Bottero et al. (2015) find that following the
Greek bailout in 2010, financial intermediaries exposed to government securities
reduced credit, affecting smaller Italian firms’ investment and employment
decisions. Acharya et al. (2018) investigate the impact of the sovereign debt
crisis on corporate policies using syndicated loan data. Their evidence suggests
Working Papers 6
that the loan supply contraction of GIIPS banks depresses investment, job
creation, and sales growth of European borrowers with a significant business
relationship with these banks.
In the context of the global financial crisis, Chodorow-Reich (2014) shows
that U.S. bank exposure to the Lehman bankruptcy had a sizable influence
on employment for SMEs that had pre-crisis relationships with less healthy
lenders. Cingano et al. (2016) exploit the 2007 liquidity drought in interbank
markets and document that the credit shock following this crisis affected Italian
firms’ investment spending and employment. In addition, the effect proved
stronger among small and young firms, as well as those that are heavily
bank dependent. Moreover, De Jonghe et al. (2016) show a moderate drop
in investment and asset growth for firms in Belgium that borrow from banks
affected by a funding shock.
Balduzzi et al. (2017) analyze the effects of banks’ financial market
valuations on firms’ decisions, such as investment and employment. They
study both the financial and sovereign debt crises and find evidence of
significant adverse credit-channel effects of the two crises. Finally, Popov
and Rocholl (2017) and Dwenger et al. (2017) show that exogenous funding
shocks affect labor decisions. Both studies focus on Germany and conclude
that firms associated with banks affected by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis
experienced a significant decline in employment.
3. Empirical implementation
3.1. Identification issues
Our main goal in this study is to identify how bank shocks affect firms’
performance. We tackle this issue by first assessing the response of banks
exposed to a funding shock to the supply of credit to firms. The main challenge
in this context is to isolate credit supply effects from other economy-wide
trends. We base our identifying assumption on two important requirements.
First, the bank funding shock must be uncorrelated with banks’ ex-ante credit
supply. Second, to correctly identify credit supply effects, we must rule out the
possibility that demand for bank loans drives the analysis.
For the first requirement, we argue that the sovereign debt crisis was
an unanticipated shock that hit the Portuguese banking system. The Greek
events fundamentally and unexpectedly changed market participants’ risk
appetite for sovereigns and made them more cautious about the quality of
their fundamentals. This led to a sharp increase in the spreads of bond yields
in peripheral European countries. The lack of confidence and the uncertain
economic climate surrounding Greece’s financial situation raised concerns about
Europe’s economic stability and the possibility of a contagion in other European
economies. Thus, Portuguese banks suddenly lost access to international
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medium- and long-term wholesale debt markets, which were an important
source of funding (Alves et al. (2016)). Importantly, the crisis in the Portuguese
banking system did not originate from a domestic real estate bubble. Therefore,
loses on mortgages did not adversely affect banks and firms did not witness
substantial reductions in commercial property prices. The upshot is that an
exogenous and unanticipated shock affected the balance sheets of Portuguese
banks.
To identify the credit supply, we use the exhaustive credit register managed
by the Banco de Portugal, and match this data with firm- and bank-level
balance sheet data. We select firms that have a relationship with more than
one bank and include firm fixed effects to control for firm-specific loan demand
effects following Khwaja and Mian (2008). In our sample, 82% of firms have
multiple bank relationships, which is a common feature in other comparable
data sets used in prior studies of Portugal and elsewhere (see Alves et al.
(2016) and Degryse et al. (2009)).11 12 Finally, to mitigate endogeneity concerns
further, we include all bank and firm variables at their levels prior to the bank
funding shock.
3.2. Credit supply
To identify the real effects of the bank lending channel, we must account for the
credit supply effects at the bank-firm level. We follow the established empirical
literature on credit supply using the Khwaja and Mian (2008) technique to
identify the effect of a bank liquidity shock on credit supply, considering the
observed and unobserved determinants of credit demand.13 The underlying idea
of this approach is that we can use detailed credit register data to focus on a
sample of firms with bank relationships and regress credit growth at the bank-
firm level on the bank funding shock and a set of bank-specific characteristics
while controlling for credit demand by including a set of firm fixed effects. We
estimate the following equation:
∆Lib = β1BankShockib + β2Yb + αi + εib (1)
where the dependent variable is the firm-bank logarithmic difference
between the post-shock and pre-shock average values of credit granted to
firm i by bank b. Bank Shock represents the funding shock measured at the
11. We also follow De Jonghe et al. (2016) to construct location-sector-size fixed effects
to consider both single and multiple bank relationships. Our results were robust to this
modification.
12. Farinha and Santos (2002) use Portuguese data and find that firms with greater growth
opportunities, less liquidity, or greater bank dependence are more likely to switch to multiple
bank relationships.
13. Other studies that use this approach include Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Degryse et al.
(2016), and Cingano et al. (2016).
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relationship level. Following De Jonghe et al. (2016), we define the shock as the
average value of interbank liabilities plus deposits in 2011 (post-shock) minus
the average value in 2009 (pre-shock), scaled by the average total assets pre-
shock. We calculate the weighted funding shock using the share of each bank in
a firm’s loan portfolio in 2009. Y is a vector of time-averaged pre-determined
bank-specific covariates such as size, non-performing loans (NPLs), and lending
relationships (see the appendix for detailed definitions). αi is a firm fixed effect
that controls for all observed and unobserved heterogeneity (firm-level credit
demand, firm quality, riskiness, etc.). In this context, we can separate credit
demand from credit supply and the coefficient on β1 indicates the extent to
which banks with varying degrees of funding outflows reduced their credit
growth to the same borrower. Finally, we cluster the standard errors at the
bank level.
3.3. Firm survival
To quantify the real effects of the funding shock on firms’ hazard of exit, we
estimate regressions of firm survival as a function of the funding shock as well
as firm and bank financial variables. We initially estimate the following model:
Pr(Faili = 1) = F (a0 + a1BankShockib + a2Xi + a3Yb + vs + εi) (2)
where Fail is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i exits between 2009
and 2011, and 0 otherwise. We follow the empirical literature on firm survival
and identify a firm exit as a firm closure. We find the time of exit by identifying
the moment at which firms cease to report IES information. We require that
a firm is absent from the survey for at least two years to identify an exit
because temporary non-reporting may occur for reasons besides cessation of
activity.14 F (.) denotes the standard normal distribution function. Vectors X
and Y denote a set of firm and bank control variables, respectively, that are
likely to influence a firm’s chances of survival. vs is a set of industry fixed
effects to control for industry-specific changes. The standard errors are clustered
at the bank level. In addition, we control for all observed and unobserved
firm heterogeneity (including changes in firm-specific credit demand) using
estimates of firm fixed effects (αi) from Model (3.1), as in Bonaccorsi and
Sette (2016) and Cingano et al. (2016).
14. While we are unable to distinguish exits from mergers and acquisitions (M&As) due to
the nature of the data, we note that the latter represents a very small fraction in the data.
According to Banco de Portugal statistics, M&As over the sample period range from 0.8% to
2% of all firm exits. Given that M&A are typically observed for larger firms (Moeller et al.
(2004)) and our data consists mainly of micro firms and SMEs, we expect to cover a negligible
fraction of M&A in our data.
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3.4. Firm characteristics
In vector X, we control for several firm-specific characteristics that have
an important influence on corporate failures. We first introduce Size as the
logarithm of the firm’s real total assets. Next, we add Age as the number of
years since the date of incorporation.15 In addition, we include a set of balance
sheet variables that capture of financial health. We control for Leverage, as
measured the firm’s long-term debt to total assets, Collateral, calculated as the
ratio of tangible assets to total assets, and the Z − score, which is a bankruptcy
risk indicator. We expect larger, older firms and those in better financial shape
to be associated with a lower likelihood of exit.
3.5. Bank characteristics
We follow the literature and control for several bank-specific characteristics in
vector Y . We define Bank size as the logarithm of the bank’s total assets.
Next, we control for non-performing loans (NPL) by taking the loans that
are in default as a fraction of the bank’s total assets. We expect to see a
negative relationship between bank size and firms’ chances of failure, and
a positive association between NPL and firms’ propensity to fail. We also
examine the role of firm-bank relationships by including two dummy variables:
the New lending relationship and Term. lending. The former accounts for
new relationships, while the latter captures the termination of an existing
relationship. We should expect an increase in new credit to be a good signal
for the firm’s creditworthiness, which in turn might have a positive impact on
firm performance. Further, small and illiquid banks and those with high NPL
are more likely to terminate an existing relationship with a company. Thus,
a rise in the level of lending termination should have a negative effect on our
dependent variable.
3.6. The role of firm heterogeneity
In this section, we explore how firm heterogeneity is likely to affect the impact
of funding shocks on firm exits. We hypothesize that banks may allocate credit
to firms according to their overall performance, and therefore, non-linearities
may be present. To test this hypothesis, we split our firms using three sorting
devices. First, we rely on credit lines to study credit line drawdown activity.
We can identify firms with outstanding and undrawn credit lines on a monthly
basis. The literature on credit lines suggests that bank credit lines can work as
substitutes for internal funds by allowing firms to access a certain amount of
pre-committed financing in exchange for paying a commitment fee (see Almeida
15. In untabulated regressions, we employ SIZE2 and AGE2 to control for non-linear effects,
and this does not change our main findings.
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et al. (2014)). Credit lines can be thought of as a source of liquidity (Lins et al.
(2010) and Tsoukalas et al. (2017)) because they can help firms to weather
adverse economic events (Campello et al. (2011)). In our context, credit line
drawdown is likely to reflect a firm’s demand for credit. As such, we can see
credit line drawdown activity as an additional layer of erogeneity that can
provide a cleaner identification in our models.
Next, we split firms according to their probability of default using their
z-scores. We can employ the z-score, to not only assess whether there is a
differential effect of bank funding shocks on firm exits based on riskiness, but
also to control for loan evergreening.16
We also sort firms based by age according to the time elapsed since the firm’s
incorporation. The extant literature on financial constraints concludes that
younger firms are more vulnerable to credit shocks due to lower transparency,
lack of a track record or reputation, or limited ability to pledge collateral
(Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)).
Our models include interactions of the bank shock with a dummy variable
(Dummy) indicating the firms that maxed out their lines of credit, high risk,
or young firms. For the credit line variable, the dummy takes the value one if a
firm took all credit available before the shock. For the z-score, the dummy for
riskier firms takes the value one if the pre-shock z-score is above the median
z-score of all firms in their particular industry and year. The dummy variable
for younger firms takes the value one if the pre-shock age is below the median
age of all firms in their particular industry and year.17 We set all variables in
the pre-shock period (i.e., predetermined with respect to the 2010 sovereign
debt crisis). We augment model (3.2) as follows:
Pr(Faili = 1) = F (a0 + a1BankShockib ∗Dummyi + a2BankShockib∗
(1 −Dummyi) + a3Xi + a4Yb + vs + εi) (3)
If the results confirm our hypothesis, then when banking funding shock
occurs, we should expect high risk, young firms, and firms that have drawn
down their credit lines to be more severely affected than their counterparts are.
Therefore, the coefficients associated with Bank Shock*(1 −Dummy) should
be smaller than those associated with Bank Shock*Dummy.
16. In particular, some banks provide credit to “bad” firms to avoid loan defaults, even if banks
consider these firms as the weakest borrowers (see, e.g., Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010)).
17. Our results are robust to using different cut-off points for the grouping criteria.
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4. Data and summary statistics
4.1. Data description
We use proprietary administrative data from the Portuguese central bank. This
data contains detailed, high-quality matched firm-bank information. We have
data on credit relationships and balance sheets for both firms and banks before
and after the sovereign debt crisis. We collect our data from three main sources.
We rely on the Central Credit Register (CRC) of Banco de Portugal to
obtain loan-level information for the period 2005 to 2014. This comprehensive
data set records all loans granted to non-financial companies by all banks
operating in Portugal. The threshold for reporting loan information is 50
euros; hence, the credit register records the universe of outstanding loans
to corporations and individuals. This database contains information about
the amount of the loan and its type, namely if it is in a regular situation,
renegotiated, overdue or potential.
We combine credit register data with two other data sources. First, at
the bank level we merge credit register with bank balance sheet data, from
which we extract bank characteristics such as size, profitability, liquidity,
credit risk and interbank borrowing. The bank-level data are reported at a
monthly frequency. Second, at the firm level, we merge the data with firm
annual balance-sheet data, from which we obtain firm-specific characteristics
such as size, age, leverage and collateral. Following normal selection criteria
used in the literature, we exclude companies with incomplete data for our
explanatory variables and firm-years with negative sales. To control for the
potential influence of outliers, we remove observations in the one percent of the
upper and lower tails of the distribution of the regression variables. Our panel
includes 1,590,203 firm-bank observations with 492,208 firms.
4.2. Sample analysis
Table A.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
regression models as a preliminary analysis. We report these values for the
whole sample. Over the sample period, the statistics show that the average
bank shock is equal to -3.9%, indicating an outflow, while the average growth in
credit granted is positive, at 0.3% with a cross-sectional variation according to
the standard deviation, which is 4.79%. The latter statistic indicates that some
firms experienced a substantial drop in credit exposure, while others increased
their uptake of credit. Moving to the extensive margin of credit, we observe
that 36.3% of the bank-firm relationships were new, meaning that they did not
exist before the shock. We also observe that 24% of the bank-firm relationships
were terminated before the shock.
The middle panel of Table A.1 reports the bank-level summary statistics.
The bottom panel reports the firm-level statistics. At the firm-level, our data
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set consists of more than 330,000 firm-year observations. The exit rate for firms
in Portugal during the sample period is 27%, implying a relatively high number
of exits.18 In addition, the average firm in our sample is sixteen years old, with
a median of thirteen years. The mean leverage ratio is 24.6% with a median of
20.2%. Finally, the average firm is well collateralized, with a ratio of 28%.
Figure A.1 illustrates the evolution of firm exits over the sample period,
and distinguishes between firms with above- and below-median exposure
to the bank shock. The figure shows that firms exposed to the funding
outflow experienced consistently higher failures compared to their counterparts.
Moreover, the gap between the two groups further widened from 2010 onwards.
5. Results
5.1. Credit supply
A basic premise of this study is that the European (sovereign) debt crisis
created significant loan disruptions in Portugal. To assess this claim, we begin
by estimating models of credit supply growth at the bank-firm level. In other
words, we evaluate the variation in credit growth from banks with differing
exposure to the funding shock to the same firm. Table A.2 reports the findings
on the effect of a funding outflow on credit growth. As we mentioned above,
we separate credit demand from credit supply using firm fixed effects following
Khwaja and Mian (2008).
Columns 1-3 report the results when we include the funding shock, add
bank-specific characteristics, and quantify the additional effects of bank shocks
according to the potential for bankruptcy using the firms’ z-scores.19 The
findings point to a strong reduction of credit growth following a funding
outflow, since the coefficients on all models are highly statistically significant.
Specifically, firms that borrow from banks affected by a funding outflow face a
tighter credit supply. This finding is significant, not only statistically, but also
economically: given that the total amount of credit granted before the shock
was 82 billion euro, the point estimate of 1.47 implies a reduction in credit to
the average firm by 5.7 percent. Hence, this translates into a drop in credit
availability of 4.7 billion euro. This finding is in line with De Jonghe et al.
(2016), who show a similar reduction in credit growth in Belgium following the
collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, we base our analysis on a much broader
sample compared to the study in Belgium, and our study includes micro and
small firms, which are likely to be bank-dependent. In sum, we show that highly
18. The evolution of failure rates, however, as Figure A.1 shows, is in line with those in
Bulletin (2017)
19. We have to drop firm fixed effects to include firms’ z-scores in the lending equation.
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affected banks that experience a funding outflow reduce lending to the same
borrower more relative to less affected banks. Therefore, consistent with our
expectations and findings from prior studies, negative funding shocks adversely
affect banks’ supply of credit.
5.2. Firm performance
In this section, we examine the role of a funding shock in firms’ survival. We
first estimate a baseline model of business failure as in Equation (3.2). Table
A.3 reports the results. In column 1, we report the results without controlling
for credit demand, while in column 2, we follow Bonaccorsi and Sette (2016)
and Cingano et al. (2016) and control for credit demand by incorporating the
firm-level dummies estimated in the credit supply regressions reported in Table
A.2. Our results remain unchanged after including a control for credit demand.
Finally, in column 3, we augment the model with a firm’s risk of bankruptcy
using its z-score.
The point estimates on bank shock suggest a robust relationship between
the funding shock and the chances of firm failure. The bank shock has a positive
and highly significant coefficient for all models reported in the table, which
clarifies the impact of a ceteris paribus bank shock on the hazard of exit.
The results show that firms borrowing from banks that experience a funding
shock are more likely to face a higher probability of exit. In terms of economic
magnitude the marginal effect of the coefficient on a bank funding shock, as
column 2 of Table A.3 shows, indicates that the average firm in our sample that
borrowed from a bank that experienced an outflow of 3.9%, faced an increase in
the probability of failure of 1.72 percentage points. This supports our hypothesis
that an exogenous shock to the bank supply, such as the European sovereign
debt crisis, negatively affects firms’ chances of survival. Put differently, firms
borrowing from banks exposed to a funding outflow are more likely to exit.
Next, we focus on the firm-specific control variables. The coefficients of Size,
Age, and Leverage are all mostly significant and precise. Larger and older firms
are less likely to exit, consistent with Mata and Portugal (1994); Audretsch and
Mahmood (1995); and Dunne et al. (1998). We also document that leverage is
positively associated with the probability of exit, implying that firms with high
debt levels have lower chances of survival. Overall, these findings show that
firm health plays a crucial role. Our results are in line with several studies that
highlight the role of the balance sheet position in corporate outcomes (see, e.g.,
Zingales (1998); Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006); and Tsoukas (2011)).
In terms of the bank-specific characteristics, we find that firms that
terminated their lending relationships as of 2009 are associated with higher
chances of firm exit. We also see evidence that firms that established a new
lending relationship before the shock are more likely to fail. Finally, a higher
level of NPLs is related with an increased probability of firm exit.
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In summary, our results so far suggest that firms associated with banks that
experienced a larger funding outflow are likely to face an increased hazard of
failure. This new result complements earlier work and highlights the role of
bank shocks in the real effects of the sovereign debt crisis in Portugal.
5.3. Are firms affected proportionally?
We now consider the impact of financial constraints on the response to bank
shocks. No prior study as of yet addresses this question using firm-bank
data for firms’ survival prospects. Table A.4 presents the estimates for the
interaction terms between a bank shock and financial constraint dummies. The
results, which are remarkably consistent across the constraint categories, reveal
heterogeneity between firms that the estimates for the full sample do not show.
In the first column, we report point estimates using bank credit lines as a sorting
device, while in the subsequent columns, we rely on z-score and age. A bank
shock negatively influences survival chances for constrained firms, but does not
do so for unconstrained firms, for which we find an insignificant relationship
in two out of three cases. In other words, we find that a bank shock is likely
to increase the chances of exit more for firms that maxed out their credit
lines, are riskier, and are younger compared to their counterparts. Based on
the extracted marginal effects, the impact of a funding shock of 3.9% leads
to an increased probability of failure of 1.85 percentage points for firms that
used their credit lines or of 1.92 percentage points for high risk companies.20
This may be because financially constrained firms are associated with a higher
degree of information asymmetry and are less able to find alternative sources
of finance when they borrow from banks that are strongly affected by a funding
shock.
We conclude that the hazard of exit increases for financially constrained
firms when they borrow from banks exposed to funding shocks, but
unconstrained firms remain unaffected. In addition, the point estimates across
the interaction terms are significantly different from each other for all three
classification methods. Finally, the other variables show the expected signs and
retain their significance in most cases.
6. Robustness checks
6.1. CDS spreads
We now shift our attention to banks’ CDS spreads as a market instrument of
their financial health. Balduzzi et al. (2017) show that increases in banks’ CDS
20. We do not calculate the economic importance for the interaction terms with the
unconstrained group of firms because they do not differ statistically from zero.
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spreads affect client firms’ credit supply conditions, and thus their employment
and investment prospects. In the same spirit, we re-estimate our survival
equations to check whether financial market valuations capture crisis-related
shocks.21 We obtain data for three banking groups that correspond to eight
banks in Portugal.22
Tables A.5 and A.6 report the results. We first confirm that firms associated
with banks that faced an increase in their CDS spreads were more likely
to exit. Therefore, banks’ financial valuations contain information about the
cost of funding and have a strong effect on firm exits. We then explore firm
heterogeneity and find that both types of firms respond strongly to CDS
spreads. Tests of equality suggest that the interaction terms are significantly
different from each other in two out of three cases. Thus, overall, we confirm
that our results are robust to an alternative shock based on market valuations.
6.2. Sovereign exposure
We explore an alternative channel of shock transmission from the financial to
the real sector, namely, the sovereign debt channel to consider banks’ sovereign
holdings as a fraction of their total assets to measure sovereign exposure. Some
previous studies use similar measures of firm exposure to the sovereign through
its lenders (Bottero et al. (2015); Barbosa (2017); and Buera and Karmakar
(2018)).
We re-estimate models (3.2) and (3.3) and report the results in Tables
A.7 and A.8. To begin with the direct effect of sovereign exposure in Table
A.7, we find that firms borrowing from institutions with greater sovereign
exposure experience a higher probability of failure. This indicates that the
heightened uncertainty and market tensions in the euro area sovereign debt
markets and the sharp increases in sovereign bond yields had a real impact on
company failures. Further, when we split our sample into financially constrained
and unconstrained groups in Table A.8, we find that firm-level heterogeneity
persists. In summary, our main results are robust to an alternative channel of
shock transmission from the financial to the real sector through banks’ holdings
of sovereign debt.
6.3. Additional tests
We conduct four additional tests of the results we report in the main section.
We summarize these additional robustness tests below, but do not report them
due to space constraints. They are available upon request.
21. The CDS market in Portugal is relatively illiquid since the largest Portuguese Banks are
smaller relative to the largest European.
22. The CDS data come from Reuters.
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First, to confirm that our findings are not driven by the construction sector,
which is inherently riskier, we reproduce the models after removing firms that
operate in this industrial group.23 All significant point estimates remain within
the same confidence interval and retain their level of significance. Thus, we
conclude that including the construction sector in our sample does not bias our
results in any way.
Second, we perform a placebo experiment to test for an underlying trend
before the sovereign debt crisis. We use 2008 as a fictitious shock period for
which the true effect of funding outflows is zero. Our results demonstrate an
insignificant impact of the bank shock on firm exits. We find this quantitatively
unimportant result for both constrained and unconstrained firms. In sum, the
placebo tests confirm the validity of the identification strategy, supporting the
common trend assumption.
Third, we examine whether the European Banking Authority’s (EBA’s)
sovereign capital buffer can perhaps have a bearing on our findings. We refer
to the EBA’s October 2011 unexpected increase in the minimum levels of the
Core Tier 1 ratio to 9% by the end 2011 and 10% by the end of 2012. The
timing of the exercise was unexpected, as the EBA conducted a round of stress
tests in July 2011 (see Gropp et al. (2018)). Only a sub-set of Portuguese banks
were subject to the EBA intervention and had to meet these criteria.24 To this
effect, we now investigate whether the deleveraging of the financial sector by
reinforcing banks’ capital positions is likely to have an effect on firm survival.25
The results show that the introduction of the EBA policy increased the firm-
level probability of exit within the treated group (banks exposed to the EBA
policy change) compared to their control counterparts. In addition, when we
split our firms into different groups, we find that financially constrained firms
affected by the policy change face an increased probability of failure compared
to similar firms in the control group.
Finally, we check whether our main results are robust to using a linear
probability model, which is known to perform better in the presence of a large
number of fixed effects. We show that the point estimates are quantitatively
and qualitatively very similar to those obtained from the probit model. We
conclude therefore that our main findings are robust to using an alternative
estimator.
23. According to Financial Stability (2012) “these sectors (construction and real estate) jointly
represent around 34 per cent of total loans to non-financial corporations and account for a far
higher proportion of non-financial corporations defaults (around 56 per cent)”.
24. In Portugal, the EBA’s rules affected four banking groups (containing 7 banks), namely
CGD, Banco BPI, BCP, and ESFG.
25. Previous studies show that increasing the level of capital requirements is likely to reduce
bank lending (Brun et al. (2017) and Jiménez et al. (2017)).
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7. Conclusion
Both academics and policy makers seek to understand the determinants
of company closures, with a focus on balance sheet characteristics and
macroeconomic indicators. However, they pay considerably less attention to
the potential role of bank shocks that may transmit to the real sector. This
is somewhat surprising given the large number of firm exits during the recent
financial crisis. In addition, firm exits contribute negatively to changes in the
amount of debt registered on the financial institutions’ balance sheet. Our study
builds on these foundations, but focuses on bank shocks and their real effect on
firm exits. Using panel data for firm-bank matched data in Portugal, we find
that banks experiencing a negative funding shock significantly reduced credit to
firms. Importantly, deteriorating credit conditions had a real effect. We show
that firms borrowing from banks that experienced a funding outflow have a
higher probability of exit.
We next investigate whether the effect of bank funding shocks on firm
survival depends upon firm characteristics such as credit line drawdown
activity, probability of default, and age. When we split our firms according
to these criteria, we uncover significant firm-level heterogeneity. In particular,
the negative effect of a funding shock is stronger for young firms, risky firms,
and firms that used their potential lines of bank credit. This implies that bank
shocks do not affect all firms equally, reflecting the higher risk characteristics
associated with different types of firms, namely those that are financially
constrained and subject to greater information asymmetries. Our results are
robust to alternative transmission channels of shocks from the financial to the
real sector, such as banks’ exposure to sovereign debt and their financial health.
Our results have important policy implications. If access to credit is
one factor that could shield firms against closure and poor performance,
then promoting policies aimed at making low cost credit readily available to
financially constrained, but viable, firms should be high on the policy maker’s
agenda.
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Figure A.1: Number of failing firms by bank exposure
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Obs Mean StDev p25 Median p75
Bank-firm level
Bank Shock 1,590,203 -0.039 0.075 -0.107 -0.032 0.028
∆L 1,590,203 0.003 4.791 -6.597 0 6.940
New lending 1,590,203 0.363 0.480 0 0 1
Term. lending 1,590,203 0.240 0.427 0 0 0
NPL 1,590,203 0.004 0.006 0 0 0.004
Bank Size 1,590,203 22.680 2.317 20.927 23.179 24.623
Bank level
New lending 24 0.445 0.228 0.271 0.426 0.631
Term. lending 24 0.433 0.242 0.211 0.378 0.659
NPL 24 0.053 0.044 0.023 0.032 0.089
Bank Size 24 20.782 2.332 19.081 19.803 22.674
Firm level
Fail 338,644 0.270 0.443 0 0 1
Size 338,644 13.478 1.449 12.470 13.369 14.368
Age 338,644 16.392 12.885 8 13 22
Leverage 338,644 0.246 0.220 0.080 0.202 0.424
Collateral 338,644 0.279 0.226 0.089 0.225 0.359
Table A.1. Summary statistics
Notes: The table presents summary statistics. Bank Shock is the average value of interbank
liabilities plus deposits post-shock minus the average value pre-shock, scaled by the average
total assets pre-shock and weighted by the bank-firm pre-shock lending relationship. ∆L is the
firm-bank logarithmic difference between the post-shock averaged and the pre-shock averaged
values of credit granted to firm i by bank b. New lending is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has
a loan from a bank that it had no relationship pre shock, and 0 otherwise. Term. Lending is a
dummy equal to 1 if a bank has terminated an existing relationship as of 2009, and 0 otherwise.
NPL measures the fraction of loans that are in default as a fraction of the bank’s total assets
pre shock. Bank Size is the time averaged pre crisis natural logarithm of the bank’s total
assets. Fail is a dummy that equals 1 if firm i fails, and 0 otherwise. Size is measured by the
firm’s pre shock logarithm of real total assets. Age is calculated as the pre shock number of
years since the date of incorporation. Leverage is measured as the pre shock firm’s total debt
to assets ratio. Collateral is the ratio of the pre shock firm’s tangible assets to its total assets.
Variables are measured in thousands of euros.
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(1) (2) (3)
Bank Shock 1.867** 1.473** 1.571**
(2.27) (2.14) (1.91)
New Lending 0.846*** 1.020***
(8.66) (9.64)
Term. Lending -1.013*** -1.287***
(-8.92) (-10.08)
NPL 0.070 0.009
(1.45) 1.47)
Bank Size 0.004 0.002
(0.35) (0.13)
Z − score -3.479***
(-15.33)
Observations 1,590,203 1,590,203 1,108,271
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes No
Table A.2. Bank shock and supply of credit
Notes: The table presents OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the change between
the post-shock averaged and the pre-shock averaged values of credit. Bank Shock is the
average value of interbank liabilities plus deposits post-shock minus the average value pre-
shock, scaled by the average total assets pre-shock and weighted by the bank-firm pre-shock
lending relationship. New lending is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has a loan from a bank
that it had no relationship pre shock, and 0 otherwise. Term. Lending is a dummy equal to 1
if a bank has terminated an existing relationship as of 2009, and 0 otherwise. NPL measures
the fraction of loans that are in default as a fraction of the bank’s total assets pre shock.
Z − score is the time averaged pre crisis firms’ probability of default, as measured by the
z-score. Bank Size is the time averaged pre crisis natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets.
Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
*significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
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(1) (2) (3)
Bank Shock -0.563** -0.589** -0.507**
(-2.19) (-2.26) (-2.34)
Size -0.048*** -0.044*** -0.053***
(-15.90) (-12.60) (-12.68)
Age -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***
(-4.90) (-5.02) (-3.54)
Leverage -0.020 0.044*** -0.020
(-1.56) (4.14) (-1.60)
Collateral -0.005 -0.014 -0.045***
(-0.57) (-1.09) (-2.97)
New Lending 0.570*** 0.545*** 0.522***
(13.83) (12.50) (11.31)
Term. Lending 0.160*** 0.200*** 0.178***
(8.23) (8.70) (8.89)
NPL 0.071* 0.071* 0.076*
(1.74) (1.70) (1.84)
Bank Size -0.007 -0.009 -0.011
(-0.57) (-0.70) (-0.81)
Z − score 0.268**
(2.23)
Observations 338,644 338,644 252,336
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit demand No Yes Yes
Table A.3. The effect of bank shocks on corporate failures
Notes: The table presents probit regressions, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to 1 if the firm fails, and 0 otherwise. Bank Shock is the average value of interbank liabilities
plus deposits post-shock minus the average value pre-shock, scaled by the average total assets
pre-shock and weighted by the bank-firm pre-shock lending relationship. Size is measured by
the firm’s pre shock logarithm of real total assets. Age is calculated as the pre shock number
of years since the date of incorporation. Leverage is measured as the pre shock firm’s total
debt to assets ratio. Collateral is the pre shock ratio of the firm’s tangible assets to its total
assets. New lending is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has a loan from a bank that it had no
relationship pre shock, and 0 otherwise. Term. Lending is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has
terminated an existing relationship as of 2009, and 0 otherwise. NPL measures the fraction of
loans that are in default as a fraction of the bank’s total assets pre shock. Bank Size is the time
averaged pre crisis natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets. Z − score is the time averaged
pre crisis firms’ probability of default, as measured by the z-score. Credit demand denotes firm-
level dummies estimated in the regression reported in Column 2 of Table 2. Robust z-statistics
are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *significant at 10
%; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
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(1) (2) (3)
Credit lines Z-score Age
Bank Shock*Dummy -0.636** -0.702*** -0.819***
(-2.06) (-3.15) (-3.10)
Bank Shock*(1 −Dummy) -0.307 -0.452 -0.422*
(-0.91) (-1.59) (-1.79)
Size -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.054***
(-12.15) (-12.96) (-12.51)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002***
(-3.57) (-3.52) (-3.34)
Leverage -0.019 -0.023* -0.020
(-1.50) (-1.74) (-1.58)
Collateral -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.045***
(-2.75) (-2.92) (-2.96)
Z − score 0.268** 0.218 0.280**
(2.26) (1.58) (2.35)
New Lending 0.524*** 0.521*** 0.523***
(11.18) (11.30) (11.35)
Term. Lending 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.179***
(8.88) (8.95) (8.95)
NPL 0.687* 0.768* 0.741*
(1.71) (1.85) (1.84)
Bank Size -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(-0.81) (-0.82) (-0.79)
Observations 252,366 252,366 252,366
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit demand Yes Yes Yes
Table A.4. Firm heterogeneity and bank shocks
Notes: The table presents Probit regressions, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to 1 if the firm fails, and 0 otherwise. Bank Shock is the average value of interbank liabilities
plus deposits post-shock minus the average value pre-shock, scaled by the average total assets
pre-shock and weighted by the bank-firm pre-shock lending relationship. Dummy is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has used all available credit (column 1), if the firm’s
z-score is above the median (column 2) and if the firm’s age is below the median (column
3). Size is measured by the firm’s pre shock logarithm of real total assets. Size is measured
by the firm’s real total assets. Age is calculated as the number of years since the date of
incorporation. Leverage is measured as the firm’s total debt to assets ratio. Collateral is the
ratio of the firm’s tangible assets to its total assets. Z − score is the time averaged pre crisis
firms’ probability of default, as measured by the z-score. New lending is a dummy equal to 1 if
the firm has a loan from a bank that it had no relationship pre shock, and 0 otherwise. Term.
Lending is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has terminated an existing relationship as of 2009,
and 0 otherwise. NPL measures the fraction of loans that are in default as a fraction of the
bank’s total assets. Bank Size is the log of the total assets of the bank. Robust t-statistics are
presented in parentheses. Zscore is the time averaged pre crisis firms’ probability of default,
as measured by the z-score. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *significant at 10
%; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
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(1) (2) (3)
CDS 0.473*** 0.448*** 0.458***
(6.86) (7.03) (6.73)
Size -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.043***
(-5.56) (-4.08) (-4.72)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.23) (0.01) (0.58)
Collateral -0.030 -0.035 -0.087**
(-1.20) (-1.05) (-2.39)
Leverage 0.040* 0.153*** 0.004
(1.74) (5.76) (0.26)
New Lending 0.167*** 0.118*** 0.100***
(5.88) (3.78) (3.04)
Term. Lending 0.236*** 0.360*** 0.364***
(5.65) (6.44) (7.20)
NPL -9.497*** -9.095*** -9.323***
(-5.63) (-5.77) (-5.56)
Bank Size 0.100*** 0.087*** 0.083***
(3.72) (3.47) (3.13)
Zscore 1.144***
(6.52)
Observations 84,398 84,398 65,193
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit demand No Yes Yes
Table A.5. The effect of CDS spreads on corporate failures
Notes: The table presents probit regressions, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to 1 if the firm fails, and 0 otherwise. CDS measures banks’ CDS spreads. Size is measured
by the firm’s pre shock logarithm of real total assets. Age is calculated as the pre shock
number of years since the date of incorporation. Leverage is measured as the pre shock firm’s
total debt to assets ratio. Collateral is the pre shock ratio of the firm’s tangible assets to its
total assets. New lending is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has a loan from a bank that it
had no relationship pre shock, and 0 otherwise. Term. Lending is a dummy equal to 1 if a
bank has terminated an existing relationship as of 2009, and 0 otherwise. NPL measures the
fraction of loans that are in default as a fraction of the bank’s total assets pre shock. Bank
Size is the time averaged pre crisis natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets. Z − score is
the time averaged pre crisis firms’ probability of default, as measured by the z-score. Credit
demand denotes firm-level dummies estimated in the regression reported in Column 2 of Table
2. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the bank
level. *significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
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(1) (2) (3)
Credit lines Z-score Age
CDS*Dummy 0.483*** 0.461*** 0.470***
(5.73) (6.74) (15.25)
CDS*(1 −Dummy) 0.498*** 0.456*** 0.456***
(5.17) (6.75) (14.98)
Size -0.048*** -0.044*** -0.039***
(-4.45) (-4.98) (-5.11)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.002***
(0.59) (0.51) (4.53)
Leverage 0.016 0.015 0.002
(1.00) (0.98) (0.09)
Collateral -0.075* -0.092*** -0.089***
(-1.71) (-2.61) (-3.18)
Z − score 1.193*** 1.315*** 1.071***
(6.12) (5.07) (6.97)
New Lending 0.115*** 0.101*** 0.094***
(2.93) (3.00) (5.13)
Term. Lending 0.379*** 0.364*** 0.360***
(7.16) (7.15) (28.15)
NPL -10.347*** -9.308*** -9.345***
(-4.46) (-5.58) (-18.20)
Bank Size 0.088*** 0.083*** 0.084***
(3.10) (3.14) (7.69)
Observations 65,193 65,193 65,193
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit demand Yes Yes Yes
Table A.6. Firm heterogeneity and CDS spreads
Notes: The table presents probit regressions, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to 1 if the firm fails, and 0 otherwise. CDS measures banks’ CDS spreads. Dummy is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firms has used all available credit (column 1), if
the firm’s z-score is above the median (column 2) and if the firm’s age is below the median
(column 3). Size is measured by the firm’s pre shock logarithm of real total assets. Size is
measured by the firm’s real total assets. Age is calculated as the number of years since the
date of incorporation. Leverage is measured as the firm’s total debt to assets ratio. Collateral
is the ratio of the firm’s tangible assets to its total assets. Z − score is the time averaged pre
crisis firms’ probability of default, as measured by the z-score. New lending is a dummy equal
to 1 if the firm has a loan from a bank that it had no relationship pre shock, and 0 otherwise.
Term. Lending is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has terminated an existing relationship as of
2009, and 0 otherwise. NPL measures the fraction of loans that are in default as a fraction of
the bank’s total assets. Bank Size is the log of the total assets of the bank. Robust t-statistics
are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. *significant at 10
%; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
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(1) (2) (3)
Sov. Exposure 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.032**
(3.23) (3.14) (1.99)
Size -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.057***
(-4.99) (-4.34) (-3.36)
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.001***
(-0.79) (-0.84) (-3.18)
Collateral 0.085 0.080 -0.047**
(1.40) (1.33) (-2.74)
Leverage -0.075 -0.013 -0.022
(-1.00) (-0.15) (-1.65)
New Lending 0.580*** 0.561*** 0.498***
(10.11) (9.56) (10.57)
Term. Lending 0.250*** 0.311*** 0.163***
(4.14) (4.98) (6.94)
NPL 0.656*** 0.644*** 0.336
(3.72) (3.30) (0.88)
Bank Size 0.035 0.036 0.018
(1.20) (1.21) (1.32)
Zscore 0.216*
(1.77)
Observations 290,419 290,419 217,095
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit demand No Yes Yes
Table A.7. The effect of sovereign exposure on corporate failures
Notes: The table presents probit regressions, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to 1 if the firm fails, and 0 otherwise. Sov. Exposure measures banks’ sovereign holdings as a
fraction of their total assets. Size is measured by the firm’s pre shock logarithm of real total
assets. Age is calculated as the pre shock number of years since the date of incorporation.
Leverage is measured as the pre shock firm’s total debt to assets ratio. Collateral is the pre
shock ratio of the firm’s tangible assets to its total assets. New lending is a dummy equal to 1
if the firm has a loan from a bank that it had no relationship pre shock, and 0 otherwise. Term.
Lending is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank has terminated an existing relationship as of 2009, and
0 otherwise. NPL measures the fraction of loans that are in default as a fraction of the bank’s
total assets pre shock. Bank Size is the time averaged pre crisis natural logarithm of the bank’s
total assets. Z − score is the time averaged pre crisis firms’ probability of default, as measured
by the z-score. Credit demand denotes firm-level dummies estimated in the regression reported
in Column 2 of Table 2. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the bank level. *significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
Working Papers 30
(1) (2) (3)
Credit lines Z-score Age
Sov. Exposure*Dummy 0.034** 0.040** 0.034***
(2.01) (2.12) (5.28)
Sov. Exposure*(1 −Dummy) -0.076* 0.025 0.029***
(-1.65) (1.56) (3.88)
Size -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.058***
(-13.43) (-13.34) (-5.57)
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-3.19) (-3.16) (-3.44)
Leverage -0.022* -0.023* -0.022
(-1.65) (-1.66) (-0.65)
Collateral -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.048**
(-2.74) (-2.73) (-2.15)
Z − score 0.218* 0.207* 0.216
(1.79) (1.70) (1.00)
New Lending 0.497*** 0.498*** 0.499***
(10.59) (10.58) (66.27)
Term. Lending 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.163***
(7.14) (6.94) (29.01)
NPL 0.344 0.337 0.337***
(0.91) (0.88) (18.12)
Bank Size -0.019 -0.019 -0.019***
(-1.36) (-1.33) (-3.73)
Observations 217,095 217,095 217,095
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Credit demand Yes Yes Yes
Table A.8. Firm heterogeneity and sovereign exposure
Notes: The table presents probit regressions, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to 1 if the firm fails, and 0 otherwise. Sov. Exposure measures banks’ sovereign holdings as
a fraction of their total assets. Dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
firms has used all available credit (column 1), if the firm’s z-score is above the median (column
2) and if the firm’s age is below the median (column 3). Size is measured by the firm’s pre
shock logarithm of real total assets. Size is measured by the firm’s real total assets. Age is
calculated as the number of years since the date of incorporation. Leverage is measured as the
firm’s total debt to assets ratio. Collateral is the ratio of the firm’s tangible assets to its total
assets. Z − score is the time averaged pre crisis firms’ probability of default, as measured by
the z-score. New lending is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has a loan from a bank that it
had no relationship pre shock, and 0 otherwise. Term. Lending is a dummy equal to 1 if a
bank has terminated an existing relationship as of 2009, and 0 otherwise. NPL measures the
fraction of loans that are in default as a fraction of the bank’s total assets. Bank Size is the
log of the total assets of the bank. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the bank level. *significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant
at 1 %.
